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It should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federal-
ism," born in the early struggling days of our Union of States,
occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and
its future.1
It was fitting that in his last term Mr. Justice Black should have
bequeathed to the American people the phrase "Our Federalism" and
the discussion accompanying it-the most eloquent statement on the
subject since Chief Justice Chase's reference to "an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States. ' 2 It was fitting also that he
should have emphasized Our Federalism's historic origins. The United
States under the Constitution was born federalist; it did not truly
choose federalism or have federalism thrust upon it. As Chief Justice
Chase had said, "Both the States and the United States existed before
the Constitution."3 The genius of the Framers lay in devising a unique
form of federalism-one in which a national government was authorized
to act directly on the people within the powers confided to it rather
than solely on the states, and was endowed with an amplitude of
powers which might or might not be used as the future would dictate.
As Mr. Justice Holmes was later to say, the Framers "called into life a
f Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Presiding
Judge, Special Court under Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (Black, J.). The Justice regarded the
phrase as embodying "the belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways." Id. at 44. He elaborated:
The concept does not mean blind 'deference to "States' Rights" any more than it
means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Govern-
ment and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept
does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
aftious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal in-
terests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States.
Id.
2. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
3. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868).
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being the development of which could not have been foreseen com-
pletely by the most gifted of its begetters. ' 4
Despite the Marshall Court's resounding affirmation of the breadth
of the powers conferred on the national government,5 the use made of
these powers through the first century of our history under the Con-
sitution was restrained. Congress moved speedily to exercise its powers
with respect to patents6 and copyrights.7 The national government
conducted foreign affairs, raised and supported an exceedingly modest
army and, over considerable protest, provided and maintained an even
more modest navy, waged some foreign wars," borrowed and coined
money, levied taxes (primarily import tariffs), created the first and
second Banks of the United States, spent money both to purchase the
Louisiana Territory and, again over much objection, to make internal
improvements, and then, under the impulse of Jacksonian democracy,
it withdrew from the banking field. Beyond this the national gov-
ernment did relatively little,9 and some of what it did, notably the
Fugitive Slave Acts,10 would not be proudly regarded today. Few
people remember that until 1867 we had bankruptcy acts for only
seven years, 1800 to 1803 and 1841 to 1843.11
The judiciary made relatively little attempt to rush in where the
legislative and executive branches were unwilling to tread.' 2 Chief
4. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
5. Most notably, of course, in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819),
and G.ibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (current version in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
7. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
8. As to all of this, see Professor Abraham D. Sofaer's remarkable book, WAR,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER-THE ORIGINS (1976).
9. As a measure of self-protection I should note that since my endeavor is to present
a picture rather than a treatise, I have deliberately painted with a broad brush. I do not
pretend to have mentioned all exercises of national power either during the early years
or later.
10. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of these, principally in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215
(1847); and Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). Both acts were repealed in
1864.
11. See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 0.04 (1974). Even the Act of 1867 lasted a mere
eleven years; the first truly "permanent" Bankruptcy Act dates only from 1898. Id.
0.05, .06.
12. An outstanding exception is The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 443 (1851), where the Court not merely sustained an Act of Congress, Act of
Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 19, 5 Stat. 726, extending admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes,
but held, overruling The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825),
that such jurisdiction had always existed and applied also to all navigable waters even
though non-tidal. See G. GILMORE 9- C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIPLTY 31-32 & n.99
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Justice Marshall himself authored Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,"3
which held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights applied only to
the federal government, not to the states; he thought the question to
be "of great importance, but not of much difficulty."' 4 After what
Professor Gunther calls "gropings," 1 the Supreme Court arrived at
the celebrated formulation of Cooley v. Board of Wardens that when
Congress had not acted to utilize the commerce power, the states were
precluded from nondiscriminatory action only when "subjects of this
power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of regulation."' 16 judged by today's standards, Con-
gress did little indeed.
The watershed was the war between the states, the adoption of the
three Reconstruction amendments, especially the Fourteenth, and
enactment of the various civil rights acts with jurisdiction in the
federal courts to enforce them.' 7 Although these amendments were
doubtless intended primarily to safeguard the rights of the newly
emancipated Negroes, Mr. Justice Miller's prophecy that this would
be practically their sole effect' s turned out to be an exceedingly poor
one. In time the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment would vest the federal judiciary, particularly
the Supreme Court, with a roving authority to invalidate state statutes
and, for almost all practical purposes, to reverse the decision in Barron
v. Mayor of Baltimore.1 Along with these enactments Congress
adopted the National Bank Act of 186420 and the Bankruptcy Act of
1867.21 As important as these substantive changes was the Act of March
3, 1875,2 which for the first time (except for the abortive Judiciary
(2d ed. 1975); C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 442-46 (1974). Mention should also be made of the Court's
vigorous enforcement of the contract clause. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810), and the Dartmouth College Case, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
13. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
14. Id. at 247. Professor Gunther suggests that the question was not "all that easy."
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 489-90 (9th ed. 1975).
15. G. GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 285-87. These included one by Marshall himself,
Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
16. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
17. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. VECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 845-46 (2d ed. 1973).
18. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-82 (1873).
19. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
20. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (current version in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
21. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
22. Ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1977)).
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Act of 180123) vested the federal courts with general federal question
jurisdiction, although subject to a jurisdictional amount.
Still another score of years elapsed, however, before enactment of
the two statutes that were the real beginnings of federal regulation of
interstate business-the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,24 adopted
in response to the Supreme Court's holding that state regulation of
interstate railroad rates was not permissible under the Cooley doc-
trine, -3 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.206 These were followed,
again after the lapse of some years,2 7 by a burst of legislation in the
first Wilson administration-the Clayton Act of 1914,281 the Federal
Trade Commission Act of the same year,29 the Shipping Act of 1916, '10
and, perhaps most important though least litigated, the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913.31 The early 1920s saw four other important pieces of
legislation extending federal regulatory power: the Transportation
Act, 1920,32 which transformed the Interstate Commerce Act by placing
"the railroad systems of the country more completely than ever under
the fostering guardianship and control of the Commission," 33 the Fed-
eral Water Power Act,34 the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921,1i and
the Radio Act of 1927 3 6-the forerunner of the Federal Communica-
tions Act.3
7
23. Ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802). See Friendly, The Federal Courts in the
Third Century, in NEw YORK UNIVERSITY BICENTENNIAL ESSAYS 197, 198-99 (B. Schwartz ed.
1976).
24. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
25. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
26. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
27. Meanwhile the Interstate Commerce Act was strengthened by the Hepburn Act,
ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), and the Mann-
Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). Other
significant enactments were the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768
(repealed 1938), sustained in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911), and
the Federal Meat Inspection Act, ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 669, 674 (1906) (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 7, 16, 21 U.S.C.).
28. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 29 U.S.C.).
29. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
30. Ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
31. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 409 (1970) and in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
32. Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
33. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 478 (1924) (Taft, C.J.).
34. Ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (1970)).
35. Ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1970)).
36. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
37. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970); 47 U.S.C.
§§ 35, 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). Prior to passage of the Communications Act, inter-
state telephone operations had been, since 1910, under the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission under the Mann-Elkins Act. IV B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC
REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2373 (1973); I. SHARFIMAN, THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION 53 n.53 (1931).
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Contemplating what then seemed a rather amazing array of new
statutes extending national power, this writer was prompted to say in
1928:
The steady expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
especially since Reconstruction days, has been but a reflex of the
general growth of federal political power. That growth will not
abate, since it is responsive to deep social and economic causes.38
Although this must rate as an excellent prediction, little did the author
know what the next few years would bring.
If the war between the states was a watershed, the New Deal was
a tidal wave. Two remarkable statutes, the Securities Act of 1933'9
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,40 elevated the national
government from a negligible to a predominant role with respect to
the issuance of and dealings in securities and the operation of the
stock exchanges. An equally dramatic change in the field of labor
regulation was wrought by the National Labor Relations Act of 193541
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.42 The Securities Exchange
Act, unlike the Securities Act, provides for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion.4 3 Although the National Labor Relations Act does not, a good
deal of preemption is furnished by the judicially fashioned rule that
"[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due
regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must
yield.144 Even when litigation under this statute can proceed in the
38. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 H.ARv. L. REV. 483, 510
(1928).
39. Ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
40. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
41. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. V
1975)), sustained in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
42. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), sustained in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941). The Act is presently codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Cer-
tain of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55,
were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), as infringing the sovereignty of the States. See pp. 1031-33
infra.
43. Compare § 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) with § 22 of the 1933 Act,
id. § 77v.
44. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). The rule was
reaffirmed over four strong dissents in Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); cf. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,
421 U.S. 616, 635-36 (1975) (holding that state antitrust laws were preempted by federal
labor legislation in case where federal antitrust laws were not).
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state courts, the latter must follow not only the text of the statute but
also "federal common law" 45-a concept representing an advance in
federal power that far outweighed the abandonment in the Erie case40
of "the spurious uniformity of Swift v. Tyson."
47
These major assertions of federal power were accompanied by a
host of others-the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933,4 s the
Banking Acts of 193340 and 1935,50 the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935,51 the expansion of the Interstate Commerce Act to
include motor carriers5 2 and water carriers,5 3 the Civil Aeronautics
Act,54 the Federal Power Act,55 the Commodity Exchange Act,50 the
Robinson-Patman Act,5 7 the 1938 amendments to the Federal Trade
Commission Act58 and to the Securities Exchange Act,50 the Natural
Gas Act,60 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,01 the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 62 and the Investment Company 3 and Invest-
ment Advisers6 Acts. Perhaps an even more important alteration in
the national-state balance was worked by a statute that could hardly
have then been thought of as creating such a change-the Social
45. See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962), citing as
controlling Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
46. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
47. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 405 (1964).
48. Ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
49. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
50. Ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
51. Ch. 687, tit. I, 49 Stat. 803 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
52. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975)).
53. Ch. 722, tit. 11, 54 Stat. 929 (1940) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-923 (1970
& Supp. V 1975)).
54. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
55. Ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
56. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
57. Ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c, 21a (1970)).
58. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44-45,
52-58 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
59. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o,
78o-3 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
60. Ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970)).
61. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970 8 Supp.
V 1975)).
62. Ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77yyy (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
63. Ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 72(a), 107(f)
(1970); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
64. Ch. 686, tit. II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21
(1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
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Security Act of 1935, 65 or more accurately the portions of that Act
which established assistance programs to be administered by the states
in accordance with federal standards, with the national government
supplying varying percentages of the funds. In this and similar enact-
ments Congress has found a new and powerful tool to bring the states
into line with national thinking under penalty of losing the largesse
from the federal fisc. 66
After some slowing of the congressional mill during the 1940s and
1950s, the legislative expansion of national power resumed in the next
two decades. Of prime importance was the effort, after the lapse of
nearly a century, to utilize § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
empowers the Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."6 7 Here the basic enactments are the Civil
Rights Act of 1957,0s the Voting Rights Act of 1965,69 the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,70 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,71 and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.72 Along with this
has come a whole rash of statutes utilizing the commerce power for
the promotion of safety73 and the protection of borrowers and con-
65. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
66. In Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937), the Supreme Court
upheld the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act against a
claim that they constituted "weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy
of the states"; in the companion case of Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the
Court rejected a federalism challenge to the old age benefits scheme of the Act. Later
the Court held that federal highway funds could be conditioned on a state's compliance
with § 12(a) of the Hatch Act (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1946). For consideration
of possible remaining federalism limits on the spending power, see the discussion and
sources cited in P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 338-40 (1975),
and G. GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 251-59.
67. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
68. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
69. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973p (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
70. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1970) and in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For reasons not altogether easy to understand today, this
statute drew also on the commerce power. See the letters of Professors Gunther and
Wechsler in G. GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 217-19.
71. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81-90 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
72. Pub. L. No. 92-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
73. The single most important is the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
Others are the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 313 (1970) and in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.);
the Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (codified in scattered
sections of 23 U.S.C.); the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481,
82 Stat. 720 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1684 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)); the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub: L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 30 U.S.C.); the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L.
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sumers.7 4 Still more important is a series of laws placing the weight of
the national government behind efforts to protect the environment. 75
Considerably more troubling to me, from the standpoint of policy and
No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (Supp. V 1975); 46 U.S.C.
§ 391a (Supp. V 1975)); the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-458, tit.
II, 84 Stat. 971-77 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)); the Consumer
Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified in 5 U.S.C. §§ 5314,
5315 (Supp. V 1975); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (Supp. V 1975)); the Motor Vehicle and
Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1470 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); the Transportation Safety Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
633, 88 Stat. 2156 (codified in scattered sections of 45, 46, 49 U.S.C.); the Highway
Safety Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-280, tit. II, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (90
Stat. 451) (codified at 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-406 (West Sept. 1976 Pamphlet)); and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (90 Stat. 503) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1193-2080 (West
Sept. 1976 Pamphlet); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West Sept. 1976 Pamphlet)).
74. These include: the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-371, 82 Stat.
146 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1970) and in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.);
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 590 (1968)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970)); the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No.
91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970)); the Fair Credit
Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat.
1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730f, 1831b, 2601-2616 (Supp. V 1975)); the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat.
2183 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V
1975)), and Amendments of 1976, Pub. L .No. 94-239, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(90 Stat. 251) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-1691f (West June 1976 Pamphlet)); the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2801-2809 (Supp. V 1975)); and the Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240,
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (90 Stat. 257) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
In an interesting though not unique instance of federalism in action, see 89 HARV. L.
Rav. 998, 1000 n.28 (1976) (collecting statutory examples), the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970), which is Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
provides that transactions may be exempted from the Federal Act's requirements if the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) determines that state law provides for "substantially simi-
lar" disclosure and "adequate" enforcement, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1970). A panel of the Sec-
ond Circuit has sustained the FRB's view, see FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1975),
that federal court jurisdiction over private Truth in Lending suits continues in exempted
states. Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 752-56 (2d Cir. 1975), criticized in 89 HARV.
L. REv. 998, 1006 (1976).
75. The basic statute is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). Other
important statutes are the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224,
84 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version in scattered sections of 49, 50
U.S.C.); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975) and in scattered
sections of 12, 15, 31 U.S.C.); the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (Supp. V 1975); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1271 (Supp. V 1975); 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 346a (Supp. V 1975)); the Noise
Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1234-
1250 (Supp. V 1975); 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. V 1975)); and the Deepwater Port Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (Supp. V 1975);
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975)).
1026
Federalism: A Foreword
even from that of constitutionality, has been what seems a knee-jerk
tendency of Congress to seek to remedy any serious abuse by invoking
the commerce power as a basis for the expansion of the federal criminal
law into areas of scant federal concern."
The judiciary has made its own contribution to the growth of
national power. I have already referred to one that seems to me
wholly salutary-the development of federal common law. 77 More
controversial has been the selective incorporation doctrine whereby
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held
to make applicable to the states all the provisions of the first eight
amendments except the Second, Third, and Seventh, the indictment
clause of the Fifth, and the excessive bail protection of the Eighth.78
This constitutional revolution, effectively overruling Twining v. New
Jerseyf0 and Adamson v. California,s° became an even greater force
for federalizing state criminal procedure as a result of the expansion
of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners wrought initially by Brown
v. Allen"' and expanded by Fay v. Noia.8 2 In the wake of Supreme
Court decisions, notably Monroe v. Pape,83 there has been an un-
paralleled resort to the long-dormant civil rights acts of the Recon-
struction period-not simply to prevent discrimination against blacks
76. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 56-61 (1973); G. GUNTHER,
supra note 14, at 194-203.
77. See the cases and discussion in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 17, at 756-837.
78. The principal decisions accomplishing this include: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
650-55 (1961) (4th Amendment exclusionary rule); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
664-66 (1962) (8th Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-42 (1963) (6th Amendment right to counsel); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963) (4th Amendment exclusionary rule); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4-11 (1964) (5th Amendment right to remain silent); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (6th Amendment right to confront witnesses); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (6th Amendment right to a speedy trial); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (6th Amendment right to compulsory process);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968) (6th Amendment right to jury trial);
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969) (5th Amendment prohibition of double
jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (proof beyond reasonable doubt).
The Court has never had to say whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive bail applies to the states, although the lower courts have held that it does, see
A. GOLDSTEIN & L. ORLAND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 425 (1974); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE &
J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 772-73 (4th ed. 1974); and the Court itself has
hinted as much, see Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1972). On the indictment clause
of the Fifth Amendment, see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (holding no
incorporation), and, more recently, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972)
(citing Hurtado with approval).
79. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
80. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
81. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
82. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
83. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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but to redress many other sorts of constitutional deprivations, partic-
ularly in state prisons. In carrying out this mission, federal courts
have felt authorized to take on an enormous degree of supervision of
the operations of state prisons and mental institutions and to impose
affirmative obligations on the states.8 4 One federal court, in an effort
to obtain minority representation, has ordered the complete remodel-
ing of a city government.8 5 The risks of confrontation are serious.80
Other potent weapons for increased national power recently forged
by the Supreme Court are the expansion of the hearing component of
due process evidenced by Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.8 7 and
Goldberg v. Kelly88 and their numerous progeny, the revival of sub-
stantive due process thought by some to be implicit in Roe v. Wade,89
and the holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was an "expressly
authorized" exception to the statute prohibiting federal court injunc-
tions against proceedings in state courts. 0 In addition, the Court has
diluted the "reasonable ground-good faith" defense for state officials
(in the particular case, members of school boards) from liability for
damages under the civil rights laws by a qualification that this defense
would not apply if the officer "knew or reasonably should have known
that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility"
would violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights.91
As if this were not enough, many believe-with much reason-that
further expansion of national power is required. A former chairman
of the Securities Exchange Commission, having closely and critically
84. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), af!'d
in part, remanded in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974), discussed in A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 96-98 (1976); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); and Friendly, supra note 23, at 204-06. See also Rchm v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part
and remanded in part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F. Supp. 964
(S.D.N.Y.), modified, 396 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975).
85. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
86. The grant of certiorari in Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 380 (1976), may indicate
concern by the Supreme Court on this score. See also Justice Powell's opinion in Austin
Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring),
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the Court's grant of
certiorari, vacation of judgment, and remand in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), but expressing doubt with respect to the scope of the remedy even if the
substantive test of Washington v. Davis were met.
87. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
88. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Some of the numerous attacks on and defenses of the decision
are collected or cited in G. "GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 650-56.
90. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (holding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) an express
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)).
91. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
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examined what he terms "the Delaware syndrome," has called for a
federal law imposing minimum standards of fiduciary responsibility
and fairness on all corporations engaged in commerce with more than
$1 million of assets and 300 shareholders.92 The proliferation of state
statutes designed to aid management in retaining control of interstate
enterprises that are locally based or even that simply have property
within the state has led the framers of the proposed ALI Federal
Securities Code to provide for preemption in the area of tender offers
and takeovers. 93 The Code proposes other preemption; 94 some believe
it should propose more to avoid the costs and delays of largely duplica-
tive requirements in a field effectively regulated by the national
government. Companies that have complied with federal environ-
mental standards naturally object to being obliged to start all over
again with the states. 95 The adoption of many new federal statutes for
the protection of consumers and borrowers90 may raise again the ques-
tion of preemption not only in those areas but in the entire field of
unfair competition 97 and antitrust law with respect to interstate or
foreign transactions. And surely we will see a federal law dealing with
major aircraft accidents where there are plaintiffs from many states
and defendants who can be sued in a variety of courts, state and
federal, with consequences enticing to choice-of-law buffs but con-
siderably less appealing to litigants.9 s
92. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, '700-03 (1974). Professor Cary's proposal and related issues of federal-state corporate
regulation were the burden of a recent symposium. Symposium on Federal and State
Roles in Establishing Standards of Conduct for Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 859
(1976).
93. See ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, § 1603(c)(1) 9- pp. 145-46 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1974). Newspaper reports indicate that the situation has become so much worse that
one wonders whether this change should await enactment of the Code.
94. Id. § 1603.
95. Professor Stewart's article, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196
(1977), suggests that industry prefers state or local to federal regulation. Presumably,
however, industry does not want both.
96. See note 74 supra.
97. See Friendly, supra note 47, at 414-16.
98. Legislation introduced in the 90th (S. 3305, S. 3306, and S. 4089) and 91st (S. 961
and H.R. 8373) Congresses was not reported out of committee although substantial
hearings were held. Aircraft Crash Litigation: Hearings on S. 3305 and S. 3306 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Aircraft Crash Litigation: Hearings on S. 961
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). On these proposals, see Note, Aircraft Crash
Litigation, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1052 (1970); Note, Federal Courts-Proposed Aircraft
Crash Litigation Legislation, 35 Mo. L. REv. 215 (1970). For discussion of judicial reactions
to the problem in the absence of specialized legislation, see Note, The Applicability of
Federal Common Law to Aviation Tort Litigation, 63 GEo. L. REv. 1083 (1975), and
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Yet the movement has not been all in one direction. The cases
stemming from the decision with which we began, Younger v. Harris,9
afford one illustration. The Court has advanced from its position in
Younger that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal
proceeding brought in good faith even when the federal court plaintiff
is suing under the Civil Rights Act, 00 and from its simultaneous hold-
ing applying the same rule to declaratory judgments.' 0 ' The Court
has recently held that a federal court may enjoin neither state criminal
proceedings begun after the federal complaint was filed but before
proceedings of substance had taken place in the federal court,1'0 2 nor
state civil proceedings "in aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes,"'1 3 nor state contempt proceedings.' 0 - This important devel-
opment is analyzed in an article in this symposium: Dornbrowski by
Professor Fiss.1'0
The rising tide of imposition of procedural due process on the
states was checked at the 1975 Term by three decisions requiring
higher thresholds for showing a legally protected interest in liberty
or property. 00 Despite the dismissal of certiorari in a case that was
expected to settle the question, 0 7 there may still be hope that the
Note, The Case for a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster Litigation: A Judicial
Solution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 231 (1976), both discussing Kohr v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975),
and Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
99. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
100. Id. at 54.
101. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
102. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). But see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922 (1975). See generally The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 151
(1975).
103. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, (1975). There is some basis for fearing
that language in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976), portends an extension of
Younger to injunctions against state and local administrative officers. But see The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 244-47 (1976).
104. Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977). Even more recently, the Court has some-
what limited Huffman's reference to exhaustion of state appellate remedies as "a neces-
sary concomitant of Younger," 420 U.S. at 608, by holding that even though no state
appeal was taken, federal relief is available to a § 1983 plaintiff who has sustained
conviction and served sentence under a state law the further enforcement of which is
challenged. See Wooley v. Maynard, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 1432-33 (1977), which also permitted
injunctive relief in view of three earlier state prosecutions in rapid succession-and
thereby drew a dissenting opinion from Justice White, see id. at 4382-83. And Younger
principles have since been held to bar federal relief in favor of a general attachment
act on due process grounds while the state court enforcement action is pending. Trainor
v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535 (U.S. May 31, 1977).
105. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
106. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); and
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), discussed in The Supreme Court, 1974 Term,
89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 86-104 (1975).
107. Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976), dismissing cert. for 516 F.2d 357 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 923 (1975).
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Court will retreat from its unexplained and, in the writer's view, ill-
advised intimations that state prisoners seeking relief under the Civil
Rights Act need not exhaust administrative remedies which the state
has provided; if it does not, Congress may be persuaded to act. Federal
habeas corpus was substantially restricted when the Court held it un-
available for Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners to whom the
state had provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation in its own
courts. 08 Any reader familiar with views I expressed some years ago'00
will not be surprised to learn that I applaud this result, although I
would have preferred to have seen it reached by a thoroughgoing
judicial reconsideration of the whole subject of collateral attack on
criminal convictions or, failing that, by legislation.'" A different
perspective on this subject is provided by Professor Cover's and Mr.
Aleinikoff's article in this symposium."'
Furthermore the Eleventh Amendment still lives, to the extent of
barring federal court actions by private persons seeking funds in the
state treasury even when the funds have come there through alleged
violation of federal regulations concerning a federal welfare pro-
gram; 12 per contra, however, when Congress has authorized damage
awards in legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 3 The loudest thunderclap regarding federal-state relations was
108. Stone v. PowelI, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
109. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CH. L. REV. 142, 161-63 (1970).
110. In other words I hope the dissenters' fears of the portents of Stone will prove
justified, not indeed to the extent of "substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction," 428 U.S. at 503, but in the shape of a restriction of it to cases where it
serves the function of protecting the innocent.
111. Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
Y.ALr L.J. 1035 (1977).
112. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
113.. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The status of attorney fee awards under
the Eleventh Amendment, a question the Court noted but did not address in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 269 n.44 (1975), remains some-
what uncertain. In disposing of the companion case of Bitzer v. Matthews, the Court
affirmed the award of attorney fees out of the state treasury on the ground that the
damage award was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment and there was express
congressional authorization for fee awards to successful plaintiffs in Title VII cases. 427
U.S. at 456-57. The Court did not pass on the Second Circuit's conclusion that an award
of attorney fees fell within the Edelman exception for awards "that have only an
'ancillary effect' on the state treasury." Id. See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees and the
Eleventh Amendment, 88 H.Rv. L. REv. 1875 (1975). On June 1, 1976, the Court had
granted certiorari in Stanton v. Bond, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1976), which relied on the
Court's summary affirmance in Sims v. Amos, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), in holding that fees
could be awarded against state officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.
Stanton v. Bond, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). The Court's day of reckoning with the Eleventh
Amendment oil this subject was again postponed, however, when it summarily vacated
the judgment in Stanton, 97 S. Ct. 479 (1976), and remanded for further consideration in
light of the passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
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the decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 1 4 overruling Mary-
land v. Wirtz'1 5 and holding that the commerce clause did not au-
thorize application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and city" 6o
employees exercising traditional governmental functions.11 7 On the
same day that the Court thus restricted the commerce clause as a
source of national power, it rendered a decision-to be sure on rather
special facts-that could be taken as impairing the role of the commerce
94-559, § 2, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (90 Stat. 2641) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1970)), which authorizes fee awards to prevailing parties other than the United States
[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1979,
1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any
civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to en-
force, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Rev entie
Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ....
114. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
115. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), was preserved but
limited. See 426 U.S. at 852-55.
116. The Court's express inclusion of municipalities within the protection of its
federalism analysis, see 426 U.S. at 855 n.20, prompted Philadelphia and New York to
invoke the decision in lawsuits brought to test the constitutionality of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over issuers of municipal
securities. Chazen, More Regulation of Municipals, N.Y.L.J. December 13, 1976, at 35,
col. 3. New York subsequently consented to dismissal of its suit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1976, at 46, col. 3, and the Philadelphia suit was dismissed because compliance with
the Commission's preliminary investigation was voluntary. See 45 U.S.L.W. 2602 (June
21, 1977).
117. The Court limited its decision to the commerce power, expressly reserving the
question of Tenth Amendment limitations on such other powers as the spending power
and on legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The
view that the 1972 amendments making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ap-
plicable to state and municipal employees are not subject to successful attack under
National League of Cities is strengthened by the Court's "Cf." citation to National League
of Cities in its opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, following the comment that the amend-
ments were enacted under § 5. See 427 U.S. 445, 453 8: n.9 (1976). The question of
whether the limitations on federal regulation of states imposed by National League of
Cities applies to legislation under § 5 is at issue in two cases now before the Court.
Hazelvood School Dist. v. United States, 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S.
Ct. 730 (1977); Dothard v. Mieth, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976), prob. juris. noted,
97 S. Ct. 483 (1976); see 45 U.S.L.W. 3680-82 (U.S. Apr. 12, 1977) (summary of argu-
ments and questions presented).
Although recognizing the landmark nature of the opinion, an early commentator has
suggested that the result was foreshadowed by recent Supreme Court precedents that
collectively reflect increased concern with federal intrusion on state governmental activi-
ties. Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1881 (1976). In addition to Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the note-
writer points to Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Note, supra at 1874-78. It would have taken someone
more perspicacious than this writer to extrapolate National League of Cities from those
decisions. For additional comment, prior to the decision, see G. GUNTHER, supra note 14,
at 126; Tribe, Intergovernmnental Immunity in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 88 H,\Rv. L. REv. 682,
697-98 n.78 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 49, 50 & n.15 (1975).
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clause as a shield against state action that discriminates against citizens
of another state. 118 Altogether June 24, 1976, was one of the poorest
days the commerce clause has had for a century. 19 We surely have
not heard the last of these cases, and certainly not of National League
of Cities, which is discussed in Professor Michelman's penetrating
article in this symposium, 120 and whose implications for state enforce-
ment of federal environmental standards is discussed in Professor
Stewart's article.12 1 Whatever the verdict of history may be, these deci-
sions at least are a sure sign that the judicial tide with respect to
national power may ebb as well as flow.
This, then, is a skeletonized historical background of the problems
to which this symposium, so properly dedicated to Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, is addressed. The discussion should provide some answers to
Professor Gunther's provocative questions:
What are the values, historical and contemporary, of federalism?
Can it still be said that federalism increases liberty, encourages
diversity, promotes creative experimentation and responsive self-
government? Qr is it a legalistic obstruction, a harmful brake on
governmental responses to pressing social issues, a shield for selfish
vested interests? Is federalism a theme that constitutional law must
grapple with simply because it is there, in the Constitution? Is
the prime challenge it poses that of minimizing the obstacles that
the complexities of federalism put in the way of meeting modem
needs? Or does federalism embody more appealing values that
deserve some of the imaginative enthusiasm with which modern
constitutional law embraces the promotion of such values as
equality and freedom of speech? 22
Clearly Mr. Justice Black, who played no small part in strengthening
the role of the national government at the expense of the states, would
have answered the second and the final question with a resounding
"Yes." So, for what it is worth, would I. Although some state govern-
118. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). This upheld a Mary-
land statute which, in authorizing state bounties for the processing of "hulks," i.e.,
automobiles wrecked in Maryland, provided more favorable terms for persons doing the
processing within the state.
119. It would be dangerous, however, to regard the Hughes case as having much
doctrinal significance. The Court did not even mention it in Boston Stock Exchange v.
State Tax Comm'n, 975 S. Ct. 599 (1977), when it unanimously struck down, under
the commerce clause, an amendment to the New York stock transfer tax which gave
advantage to sales made within New York.
120. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
121. Stewart, supra note 95.
122. G. GUrrrnE, supra note 14, at 82-83.
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ments may be ignorant or venal, many are far-seeing and courageous;
and not all wisdom reposes in Vashington. There is still truth in Mr.
Justice Brandeis' renowned observation:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.123
No-fault insurance is a sufficient example; we may end up with a
uniform federal system or minimum federal standards, but we should
never have had anything save for experimentation by the states. We
must stand in awe and admiration of the design of the Framers and of
the success of the Supreme Court in fleshing it out-preventing one
state from getting in the way of others and endowing the central
government with power to act on a national basis when Congress finds
this to be warranted, but leaving to the states the final decision on
the bulk of day-to-day matters that can best be decided by those who
are closest to them. While I expect we shall be forced to pursue the
centripetal path of the last century, we should not rush along it too
fast or too far; the question whether action by the national govern-
ment is needed should always be asked. To paraphrase T. R. Powell,
how fast is too fast and how far too far are matters on which the writer
of a foreword need not express an opinion.
123. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 811 (1932).
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